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Abstract 
 
In the first essay we explore and establish a direct link between investor attention to 
advertising videos viewed on social media, and trading activity in a firm’s securities.  We find a 
positive relation between views of these advertising videos and volume, and a negative 
relationship between views and bid-ask spread.  Returns are positively related to change in 
views.  The positive price pressure is reversed over the following two weeks.  The decreases in 
spread and temporary increase in returns are consistent with increased purchasing by individual 
investors who view the advertising videos.  Our results support the hypothesis that the number of 
views (attention) is more important than advertising dollars.  Views are tested concurrently with 
Google Abnormal Search Volume Index (ASVI), and the empirical results suggest that views 
and ASVI provide measures of attention for different investor groups. Our results also suggest 
that the link of ASVI to individual investors may be diminished in more recent periods. 
In the second essay, using a unique data set provided by the Texas Comptroller of Public 
Accounts along with Dallas County, Texas Appraisal District files and Multiple Listing Service 
(MLS) sales, we examine whether residential properties sold through a multiple listing service 
sell at similar prices compared to properties that do not sell through a multiple listing service 
after controlling for Grantor (seller) type.   We find a 1.8% premium for properties sold through 
a MLS by individuals after controlling for different grantor types.   Our results indicate that only 
individuals receive this premium. 
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Viral Volume:  Social Media’s Impact on Stock Price Dynamics 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Merton (1987) suggests that “the process of inducing investors, who are not currently 
shareholders, to follow the firm’s securities is not unlike that used to market the firm’s 
products.”    This paper uses a novel database of views of seeded advertising videos to explore 
the impact of investor attention to advertising on the share price, trading volume and bid-ask 
spread of a firm’s stock.  Seeded advertising refers to the process of placing a video on pertinent 
internet sites. This placement is the "seed" which then spreads from user to user, relying on these 
users to transport it to different video sharing platforms which include direct email and social 
media outlets such as Facebook.    Online video advertising provides firms with an outlet to 
provide content to a consumer that has both entertainment value and a controlled message about 
a firm and its products.  Views of these videos leave a footprint which can be tracked and 
counted.  In our sample, the total measured views of seeded advertising videos during the first 
week of July 2009 were 5.6 million. In three years that weekly number had grown over 5 times 
to more than 28.3 million by June 2012.     
Previous research related to advertising and stock price dynamics has focused on the 
reported advertising expense in a firm’s financial statements.  Chemmanur and Yan (2012) find a 
positive relation between advertising expense and IPO valuation; Chemmanur and Yan (2011) 
find a short term positive relation between reported advertising expenditures and stock returns.   
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Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) find evidence that firms that spend more on advertising 
have more small stockholders, more institutional stockholders and better market liquidity for 
their stock.   
The link between a firm’s advertising expense and investor attention to the advertising 
message is difficult to measure directly.  Another strand of literature focuses on investor 
attention to firms in a more general sense.  Barber and Odean (2008) suggest that retail and 
institutional investors differ in their attention to specific firms.  Institutional investors 
consistently pay attention to a broad range of long and short investing opportunities available to 
them.  The same is not necessarily true for individuals, who may vary in their attention to 
alternative investment opportunities, and are more likely to pursue only long investment 
strategies.  Consistent with this, Barber and Odean (2008) find that retail investors are net buyers 
of stocks on high-attention days for those stocks, and find that several indirect proxies for 
individual investor attention are related to temporary positive price pressure.  Engelberg and 
Parsons (2011) find that local media coverage predicts local trading.  Using internet based 
information, Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) have proposed a direct measure of investor attention:  
Google search volume.  Their analysis finds increases in trades by individual investors, and 
positive price pressure for two weeks following abnormal search volume.  This  positive price 
pressure was reversed within one year.     
Fang and Peress (2009) examine longer term returns and find that firms with high media 
attention have lower returns than stocks with no media attention.  This result is consistent with 
the hypothesis that media attention is negatively related to the liquidity premium, and the 
hypothesis that stocks with lower investor recognition need to offer higher returns in order to 
induce investors to buy them. 
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For the most part, the studies related to investor attention are not able to identify exactly 
what message or content investors are actually viewing.  Engleberg, Sasseville, and Williams 
(2012) provide the most direct analysis in this area, showing that a buy recommendation of a 
stock on Jim Cramer’s Mad Money is followed by large overnight returns that are reversed over 
the following months.   This relationship is strongest when daily Neilsen ratings show high levels 
of views by higher income individuals.   
 Using social media views of seeded advertising videos to measure attention 
complements the existing literature related to advertising, individual investor attention, and stock 
price dynamics in that it closes the gap between firms’ controlled advertising messages and 
investor attention to those messages.  Tracking the number of views for each seeded advertising 
video indicates exactly how many times that a particular message, or a derivation of it, has been 
watched.    In this study, we group these views by firm week and examine their relation to 
measures of trading volume, liquidity and returns.   
We hypothesize that the relation between views of seeded advertising videos and return 
dynamics is the result of increased trading by individual investors.  Compared to institutional 
investors, individual investors are more likely to have increased awareness of a firm as a possible 
investment alternative as a result of viewing advertising media; or possibly to perceive the 
information provided in seeded advertising videos as value relevant.   We find after controlling 
for idiosyncratic volatility, price responsiveness (illiquidity), share turnover, market 
capitalization,  marketplace trading volume and volatility, earnings announcements and 
dispersion of analyst forecasts, that the level of views of a firm’s advertising videos are 
significantly positively related to abnormal weekly trading volume.      
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 Glosten and Milgrom (1985) suggest that in a specialist market, bid ask spreads widen 
when the probability of trading against more informed investors increases.  If more individual 
investors become active traders in firm’s stock as a result of exposure to advertising videos, 
specialists are expected to reduce bid ask spreads as their adverse selection problem decreases.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that the increase in volume due to individual investor activity will 
result in a decrease in bid-ask spread.  Consistent with this prediction, the empirical analysis 
shows that the bid-ask spread is negatively related to the level and the change in social media 
based views. 
We also examine the relation between views of seeded advertising videos and stock 
returns.  The change in views is positively related to contemporaneous stock returns.  This 
upward price pressure is then reversed over the subsequent two-week period, 
In terms of attention to firms via internet based media, the closest measure to ours is the 
Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) abnormal search volume index (ASVI).  ASVI measures search 
activity initiated by users on Google.  An individual searching Google for information related to 
a particular firm must be paying attention to that firm.  It is possible that views of seeded 
advertising videos are related to Google ASVI in a way that would make it difficult to interpret 
our empirical results.  Therefore, we test for contemporaneous and lagged relations between 
these two variables.  We find no relation between ASVI and views when considering 
contemporaneous or lagged measures.  Our tests suggest that ASVI and views measure the 
activities of different investing clienteles.  
We also compare the impact of ASVI on our sample companies in the time period of our 
study to the earlier time period under study by Da, Engleberg and Gao.  While we do not 
replicate the data used in their earlier study, we do find evidence consistent with their findings.  
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However, in our later sample the ASVI measure appears to be less correlated with the activity of 
individual investors than in the time period in their paper.  This may be the result of the inclusion 
of ASVI in high-frequency trading algorithms during our more recent sample period. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 reviews the related literature.  Section 3 
provides a detailed description of the data, Section 4 contains a discussion of our empirical 
results and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Related Research 
Merton (1987) developed a model of capital market equilibrium that incorporates the 
limited ability of investors to recognize stocks.  He predicted that firms that are unfamiliar to 
investors will have higher expected stock market returns and lower liquidity.  High visibility 
firms by contrast would have lower expected returns and higher liquidity.  Advertising is one 
way that firms can become more visible and familiar to individual investors.   
The literature linking advertising and stock price dynamics has primarily focused on 
reported advertising expenditures.  Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004) find that breadth of 
ownership, trading volume and liquidity are positively related to a firm’s advertising 
expenditures.  The greater visibility and familiarity associated with advertising causes both 
individual investors and institutional investors to hold more stock of firms that advertise more. 
Notably, they find that effect is more dramatic for the individual investors than it is for 
institutional investors.   Higher advertising expenditures are also associated with increased 
liquidity in the form of a narrower bid-ask spread, smaller price impacts, and greater depth.  
Grullon et al (2004) conclude that the change in ownership structure and increase in liquidity 
should also increase firm value.  The findings of Grullon, et al (2004) are consistent with Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985) and their suggestion that market-makers set a narrower bid-ask spread in the 
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presence of the less informed individual investors, because the market maker’s expected adverse 
selection costs are lower when more uninformed traders trade. 
Chemmanur and Yan (2012) find that advertising around a firm’s IPO results in higher 
IPO valuation and lower subsequent stock returns which suggests that advertising has a positive 
short-term share price impact.  Further, Chemmanur and Yan (2011) find that increases in 
advertising expenditures are positively related to price in the advertising year.  Their analysis 
uses trading volume and analyst coverage as proxies for investor attention.  The results show that 
for firms with higher advertising expenditures, the short term positive price pressure is stronger 
if the firm also experiences higher attention in the advertising year. Long term price reversals are 
positively related to proxies for arbitrage costs.   
The content of advertising messages in general is not expected to contain value relevant 
new information.  However, to investors who may have previously been unaware of a particular 
product line, brand, or firm, advertising content may appear to be news.  In the information age, 
opportunities for the individual investors to misinterpret information or to respond too slowly to 
new information are increasing.    Kim and Verrecchia (1991) propose that new information will 
be interpreted differently in the marketplace, with those investors with less private information 
weighting a new market signal more heavily than those having private information.  Therefore, a 
differential belief revision can generate trading with new information.  Consistent with this, 
Giannini and Irvine (2012) use Twitter posts to measure individual differences of opinion and 
find that when dispersion of opinion increases following an earnings announcement, abnormal 
returns are positive and post-announcement abnormal volume is higher.   
Building on the ideas of Beaver (1968), Kim and Verrecchia (1991) posit that price 
changes average out the differences in beliefs of traders; while the use of volume in conjunction 
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with returns could be used to identify systematic differences in investor knowledge.  Kim and 
Verrecchia (1994) explore the relationship of volume around price and earnings announcements 
and propose that information asymmetry can actually increase around announcements as better 
informed traders make better decisions with new information and other traders protect 
themselves.     
However, new information and advertising messages about a particular firm must have 
investors’ attention in order for them to respond by trading.   And, there is evidence that 
individual investors who are likely to be less informed differ from the more informed 
institutional investors in their response to attention-grabbing stocks.  Barber and Odean’s  (2008) 
analysis focuses on attention in a general sense; and argues that trading of individuals on high 
attention days differs significantly from trades of institutional investors.  First, paying attention 
to possible investments, long or short, is what institutional investors do.  Their attention is not 
divided or limited by other work obligations.  Institutional investors also have access to 
technology and databases that allow automated analyses which individuals often cannot 
replicate.  Additionally, institutions hold relatively large portfolios, and therefore they have a 
larger inventory from which to sell holdings; so even if they do not actively short, institutions 
have more choices when selling.  Individual investors, on the other hand, often have more 
sporadic attention to investing, they have fewer resources to use in their analysis, and they hold 
relatively small portfolios.  Portfolio size is important, because individuals typically only sell 
stocks that they already hold in their portfolios; they rarely sell short.  Therefore, individual 
investors are expected to be net buyers of attention grabbing stocks:  contrarians will buy stocks 
with poor recent performance that capture their attention, while momentum investors will buy 
stocks that have had positive returns around the time that they attract attention.  Consistent with 
 8 
 
these predictions, Barber and Odean (2008) find evidence that individual investors tend to be net 
buyers on high attention days, where attention is measured using the following proxies:  
abnormal trading volume, the stock’s prior one day return, and news reports mentioning 
particular firms.  Buying behavior of professional money managers was less affected by these 
measures of attention. 
Da Engelberg, and Gao (2011) propose that the online search activity of investors can 
serve as a predictor of their market behavior.  Using Google search volume as a measure of 
investor attention to specific firms, their analysis finds increases in trades by individual 
investors, and positive price pressure for two weeks following abnormal search volume.  Da, et 
al find that the positive price pressure is reversed within one year.   This stock price pattern is 
also consistent with Barber and Odean’s  (2008) suggestion that individual investors are more 
likely to be buyers of stocks than sellers; thus when individuals pay more attention to particular 
stocks, there is a temporary positive price effect.  Da, et al (2011) also find that the temporary 
price increase is strongest for stocks that are traded more by individual investors.  Additional 
analysis of IPO first day returns also indicates that individual investor attention is positively 
related to both IPO first day returns and longer term return reversals for the newly listed stocks. 
Attention to television media has also been linked to investor attention and stock price 
dynamics.  Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2012) find that a buy recommendation of a 
stock on Jim Cramer’s Mad Money is followed by overnight returns averaging 2.4%; this 
positive effect is reversed over the following months.   The effect is partially dependent upon 
measures of attention:  buy recommendations that are less prominent, or mentioned more briefly 
are associated with a smaller overnight abnormal returns.  Additionally, when total viewership is 
higher, overnight returns are larger; and this relationship is driven by increased viewing by 
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higher income individuals.  Increased viewing by lower-income households is not related to 
overnight returns. 
Seasholes and Wu (2007) examine attention driven trading on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange.  This exchange imposes limits on daily price changes; after a stock hits the limit it 
may continue trading, but may not exceed the limit.  When a stock hits the upper price limit, it 
also has unusually high volume and returns, and the event generates news after the market 
closes.  This study identifies a group of informed traders that anticipate the marketplace reaction 
to the “news” of an upper-price limit event.  Individuals are net buyers following the price limit 
attention event, and tend to buy stocks that they did not previously own.  This trading by 
individuals appears to drive prices up the day after the event.  However, over the following four 
days, prices mean revert.  The informed traders profit from buying early and selling into the 
abnormal individual demand that follows the upper price limit news event.  This anticipation of 
the news allows them to buy before the event and sell after it.   
Fang and Peress (2009) examine the effects of media coverage on cross sectional stock 
returns, and find that stocks without media coverage earn higher returns than stocks that are 
heavily covered, even with controls for liquidity, size, book to market, and momentum.   This 
media effect is pronounced among small stocks and less liquid stocks, suggesting that the media 
effect is at least partly liquidity related.  At the same time, the media effect is also strong among 
stocks that have low analyst coverage, high individual ownership, and high idiosyncratic 
volatility, suggesting that there is also an information component to the media effect on price 
consistent with Merton’s (1987) argument that stocks with problems related to information and 
recognition need to offer higher returns. 
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Our analysis complements the existing literature related to the effects advertising and 
investor attention on stock price dynamics by providing analysis of a specific advertising 
medium in which attention to the advertising message can be directly measured.  Because 
advertising usually does not contain value relevant news, we expect that the relation between 
views of advertising videos and stock trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and price will be driven 
by individual investors.  In short, we predict a negative relation between views and bid-ask 
spread, and a positive relation between views of seeded advertising videos and both trading 
volume and returns.  The positive relation between views of advertising videos and returns is 
predicted to be short lived.  This is because the hypothesized increase in demand that stems from 
views of advertising videos is not associated with value relevant news, and therefore is reversed 
subsequently.  Further, to the extent that the market views the increases in volume as persistent, 
then the required liquidity premium on the stock may decrease, causing a decrease in required 
returns. 
3.  Variable Construction 
3.1 Measuring Investor Attention to Advertising 
This analysis uses a proprietary database that tracks views of seeded advertising videos 
on more than one hundred separate platforms to measure investor attention to online video 
advertising.  Over three-hundred seventy-five million unique videos are included in the database.   
The first chart was for the week ended July 17, 2009.  The final chart used was issued for the 
week ended December 30, 2011.  All weeks end on Sunday and the data is available on the 
following Thursday.  The database tracks views regardless of whether they were seeded by the 
company, an advertising agency or placed by another user.  Each time a video is viewed, a 
counter “tracks” the view.  Those counts are recorded weekly.   
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As the source of this data is advertising data, this data is tracked in the database by 
“campaign” or program. These campaigns typically map neatly into one or two companies.  
These campaigns are summed by company by week for inclusion in this study.  Non-public firms 
are eliminated.  Advertising campaigns that are listed as being for more than one brand (for 
example:  Apple and AT&T had common advertisements for the iPhone) are summed into the 
totals of both firms equally.  Some advertising campaigns impact as many as three brands and 
are summed equally into the consolidated view total of each of the three different firms. 
There was tremendous growth in the visibility of seeded advertising during the sample 
period.  Mean weekly views for the sample firms are 59,378 from July to December 2009, and 
204,545 for all of 2011.  The growth continued throughout 2011 with the mean weekly views 
starting January at 141,890, and growing to 248,518 in December 2011.  
Brands from the advertising campaigns are mapped into one hundred twenty-three public 
firms.  Firms that do not trade or are not public for the entire sample period are eliminated.  Also, 
firms that trade solely on foreign exchanges and ADR’s are eliminated.  The final sample 
consists of seventy-five firms with views of seeded advertising videos for at least one week of 
the total sample period.   These firms represent fifty-three different SIC codes at the four-digit 
level and twenty-six SIC codes at the two-digit level.  Summary statistics regarding the sample 
firms are presented in Table 1.  In total, the sample consists of 9,299 firm weeks. However, not 
every firm has social media viewing activity in every week.   
 Sample summary statistics are presented in Table 1.  Mean views of seeded advertising 
videos in the last year of our sample total 204,545.  On a firm basis, the maximum weekly views 
grew from 2.7 million views in 2009 to 33 million views in 2011.  These numbers may include 
multiple advertising campaigns for each firm in any given week. 
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3.2 Seeded Advertising and “Going Viral” 
The term “viral marketing” was first coined in 1996 by two venture capitalists describing 
the practice of the Hotmail email service appending to messages “Get your private, free email 
from Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com”. (Porter Golan 2006) This link was passed along from 
user to user with every email forwarded.  Helm (2000) has described it as “a communication and 
distribution concept that relies on consumers to transmit [content].”   
The power of this medium partially lies in the fact that it is driven by ‘choice.’  A 
messenger chooses to pass on some message.  Boynton (2011) defines the term “going viral” as  
describing one of three possible definitions.  These definitions are 1) videos with “many” views, 
2) videos spread from multiple points as in a “virus” and 3) a functional form of epidemic 
growth (sigmoid)  that starts small but grows exponentially until it has “run its course” and all 
are infected.  Richardson and Domingos (2002) describe it as marketing which “takes advantage 
of networks of influence among consumers to inexpensively achieve large changes in behavior.”  
Our use of the term viral advertising to describe sharing of seeded advertising videos is closest to 
the description used by Richardson and Domingos’ (2002).  
3.3 Seeded Advertising Video Views and the Google Search Volume Index 
It is possible that views of seeded advertising videos are related to the measure of 
abnormal Google search volume examined by Da, Engleberg and Gao (2011).  Their analysis 
shows that the abnormal Google Search Volume Index (ASVI) leads other indicators, including 
share turnover and news, as proxies for investor attention.   If ASVI also leads views of seeded 
advertising videos, not including it in the analysis could result in an endogeneity problem.   
Following Da, Engleberg and Gao (2011) we employ measures of SVI and ASVI.  SVI is 
a scaled measure collected directly from Google.  It is calculated as a firm’s search volume in a 
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relative period scaled by its time series average and then recalibrated so that the largest number 
is equal to 100.  In some ways the measure is an estimate:  In order for Google to conserve 
resources, it is calculated using a small sample of volume during the period.  Therefore, each 
time you request the data it will be marginally different.  Da, et al found the differences to be 
immaterial and they were not tested here.  The measure is constructed as the natural log of the 
SVI less the median of the log SVI from the previous eight weeks.  We also examine the relation 
between views of seeded advertising videos and ASVI; discussion of this analysis is presented in 
section 4.5.   
3.4 Returns, Volume, and Spread  
Daily security prices, daily volumes and S&P500 prices are collected from CRSP through 
December 30, 2011 and the daily volumes for Monday through Friday are summed and grouped 
to be compared to the week in which it has the greatest overlap with the views: where Monday 
through Friday overlap and any potential weekend views are compared to the week before them.   
Average volume of shares traded is 56 million per week over the full sample period.    
 Following Blankespoor, et al (2012) and Asthana, et al (2004) an abnormal trading 
volume statistic over a rolling one year period is constructed.  This is calculated by computing 
the trading volume for that week and the fifty-one prior weeks and then averaging those 
volumes.  This variable is then standardized by taking the mean of the firm’s abnormal volume 
in the sample period, subtracting this mean from the observation and dividing by the standard 
deviation of the abnormal volume during the sample period.  Since this variable is deflated by 
the standard deviation of the abnormal volume during the sample period, it has the effect of 
controlling for idiosyncratic volatility as it relates to volume at the firm level.  A particularly 
volatile firm will have a larger standard deviation and thus a lower abnormal volume statistic. 
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This construction tends to bias against results for abnormal volume as the mean and standard 
deviation are calculated using the past year and the volatility during the sample period tested 
forms the standardized statistic.  Regarding construction of this statistic, there is no consensus in 
the literature regarding the construction of an abnormal volume statistic (Bamber, Barron, 
Stevens 2011).  Our results are robust to using natural log and raw trading volumes.1   
We construct the weekly bid-ask spread estimate  as the proportional bid-ask spread as 
the average of the daily proportional bid-ask spreads during the weekly period.  The proportional 
bid-ask spread is calculated as   
       
       
  . 
We begin with two measures of excess returns:  the first is the contemporaneous weekly 
excess return, measured in the same week as the views of seeded advertising videos.  The second 
excess return is cumulative excess returns for the following two week period (t+1, t+2).  In each 
case, excess returns are market adjusted, and are calculated as the total return for each firm less 
the S&P500 return in the relevant time period.  The mean contemporaneous weekly excess return 
is 0.02% and the mean two-week excess return is -0.12%.  
3.5  Control Variables 
In the multivariate analysis, we attempt to control for firm level and market level factors 
that might influence firm trading volume, spreads, and abnormal returns.  We control for size of 
the firms using Market Capitalization computed using shares outstanding and price from CRSP 
for each week.  The mean market cap for the sample firms is $42.8 billion.  We construct an 
Illiquidity measure for each firm’s stock following Amihud (2002).  This measure is constructed 
                                                 
1 In untabulated results, to control for possible endogeneity in the volume of shares traded in the 
sample we control for the mean of shares traded for the firms in the sample using the log of the 
weekly volumes as calculated from the daily volumes in CRSP.  The mean weekly volume is 
insignificant and the remaining results are substantively unchanged. 
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as the average daily ratio of a stock’s absolute stock return to its dollar volume scaled by 106 
averaged over the weekly period, and serves as proxy for the component of liquidity related to 
price impact caused by trading volume.  A measure of share turnover is constructed as weekly 
trading volume (number of shares), divided by the average shares outstanding that week.  In our 
sample, the average firm has weekly share turnover of approximately 62 times.  This variable 
controls for the effect of the number of shares outstanding on trading volume.    We also collect 
the number of analysts following firms, their forecast mean and standard deviation from IBES.  
Following Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) we calculate dispersion of analyst opinion as 
the standard deviation of forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the mean.  We find that analyst 
coverage ranges from 1 to 54 analysts per firm, with a mean of 17.4.  The estimated dispersion of 
analyst forecast has a mean of 0.13. 
In order to control for overall market activity, we use NYSE total volume for each week.  
To control for market volatility we use the weekly closing value for the CBOE Volatility Index 
for each week.   CBOE volatility data is obtained directly from CBOE.  
4.  The Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Univariate Tests 
Table 2 presents the results of univariate regressions.  These are OLS regressions using 
firm fixed effects, clusters at the firm level, and clustered robust standard errors.  Panel A 
examines the relation between the changes in views and level of views and three measures of 
volume; Ln volume, abnormal volume and standardized abnormal volume.  The change in views 
is not significant while the relation between ln views and the abnormal volume, and standardized 
abnormal volume is significantly positive.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that advertising 
increases the visibility of a firm, resulting in more investors paying attention to the firm’s stock 
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and trading it.  In subsequent regression analyses, we use the standardized abnormal volume 
measure.  We also find that Google ASVI is positively related to the natural log of volume, and 
standardized abnormal volume.   This is consistent with the finding of Da et al (2011), which 
suggest that abnormal search volume predicts increased trading by individual investors.   
Panel B presents univariate regressions of bid-ask spread on the changes in the natural 
log of views, the level of the natural log of views, and a specification with Google ASVI. We 
find a significant negative relation between Ln views and Changes in Log Views, and bid ask 
spread, consistent with Glosten and Milgrom’s (1985) prediction that bid ask spreads decrease 
when less informed individual investor trading activity increases, and the probability of trading 
against an informed trader decreases.  Google ASVI has a positive relation with bid-ask spread.  
Because our primary variable of interest is weekly, our results are not directly comparable to Da, 
et al’s (2011) earlier results and interpretation.  But, our results related to bid ask spread do 
suggest that at weekly intervals, these two measures contain information about different investor 
groups.  The increase in bid ask spread associated with Google ASVI suggests higher probability 
of trading against an informed trader.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that as profits from high 
frequency trading algorithms have declined in the past few years, many of the high frequency 
trading programs have included twitter feeds and internet search trends in their analysis.2  Our 
sample period begins in 2009, while the sample period used by Da et al (2011) ends in 2008.  
This may partially explain our finding that Google ASVI is associated with an increase in bid ask 
spreads, and also the differences in results related to excess returns.  This hypothesis is more 
fully explored in Table 5a. 
In Panel C we regress weekly (contemporaneous) excess returns on both changes in and 
the level of the natural log of views.  Changes in the level of views is significantly positively 
                                                 
2 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-06/how-the-robots-lost-high-frequency-tradings-rise-and-fall#p1 
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related to  weekly excess returns while the second model shows a significantly negative relation 
between views and weekly excess returns.  The positive relation between contemporaneous 
returns and changes in the level of views suggests that when viewing activity is increasing more 
dramatically, there is a positive effect on price.  The negative relation between contemporaneous 
weekly returns and the level of views is consistent with an increase in liquidity due to increases 
in volume.   The third specification includes only the change in Google ASVI as a regressor.  
The estimated coefficient for Google ASVI is positive but not statistically significant. 
Panel D presents regressions of cumulative two-week returns from the two weeks 
following the contemporaneous week (t+1, t+2) on the specifications of weekly views and 
weekly Google ASVI.  Here, the relation between two-week excess returns and changes in the 
natural log of views is not significant while the relationship between the level of the natural log 
of views and monthly excess returns is negative.  We also find that the relation between two-
week excess return and Google ASVI is not statistically significant.   Da, et al.  (2011) find a 
positive relation between ASVI and returns in the subsequent two weeks, where individual 
investor buying pressure temporarily increases prices, but the effect does not last in the longer 
term.  It may be the case that the short term positive relation between ASVI and returns found by 
Da, et al (2011)  is sensitive to their two week return measure rather than the weekly measure 
that we use, and that the four week return period we use effectively captures a significant portion 
of their reversal effect which was found over the following year.  However, we do not test this 
hypothesis in this study. 
Table 3 presents difference of means and difference of medians tests for share turnover, 
standardized abnormal volume, bid ask spread, and contemporaneous excess returns.  In Panel A, 
these variables are compared based on firms using seeded advertising that is shared on social 
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media, and a matching firm portfolio of firms that never appear in the seeded advertising sample.  
Each firm is matched with at least three other firms.  The firms are matched on market 
capitalization and share trading volume by four digit SIC code where possible or to two digit SIC 
code if no matches are available at the four digit SIC level.    Some firms are matched to more 
than one sample firm.  There are 97 different firms in the matching portfolio.  Each firm receives 
equal weight regardless of how many times it is matched to sample firms.   
The results indicate that firms with views of seeded advertising videos have higher share 
turnover, mean standardized abnormal volume, and bid ask spread.  Contemporaneous weekly 
returns are lower for the sample firms than for the matched firms, while monthly excess returns 
do not differ significantly in the two groups.  The higher bid ask spread in the sample firms 
appears inconsistent with results found in Table 2, but this is because it is a difference in levels 
based on a matched sample with no views of seeded advertising videos and not a measure of bid-
ask spread as relates to an individual firm.   
In Panel B, we look exclusively at firm weeks within our sample, comparing firm weeks 
with no views during the sample period to firm weeks with views during the sample period. We 
find that firm weeks with views have lower bid ask spreads than firm weeks without views.  This 
is consistent with the results we find for bid ask spread in Tables 2 and 5.  Results for share 
turnover, standardized abnormal volume, and contemporaneous return are similar to those found 
in Panel A.   In Panel B we find that for the sample firms, firm weeks with views of seeded 
advertising videos have significantly lower contemporaneous excess returns than firm weeks 
without views.  We hypothesize that these lower returns are related to the reduction of liquidity 
premiums due to increased volume and this is discussed further in section 4.4. 
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4.2  Views of Seeded Advertising Videos and Abnormal Share Volume 
Fixed-effects panel regressions using standardized abnormal volume as the dependent 
variable are presented in Table 4.  Standardized abnormal volume is calculated based on a 52-
week moving average and then deflated by the standard deviation of those averages.  The main 
variable of interest is the natural log of views of seeded advertising videos by week for each 
firm.  Control variables are included for market capitalization to control for size, NYSE volume 
to control for market volume, the CBOE volatility index to control for market-level volatility, 
firm-specific share turnover, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, earnings announcements 
and dispersion of analyst forecasts.3.   
In the first specification included in R1, we find that ln views is significantly positively 
related to standardized abnormal trading volume.  At a sample mean price of $76.8 per share and 
a coefficient of approximately .03, the weekly dollar impact in share trading would be in excess 
of $129 million.  These results are consistent with the argument that views of seeded advertising 
videos on social media are associated with an increase in trading activity.   
The specification R2 includes ASVI and we find that the positive relation between views 
and volume holds, and that ASVI is also positively related to volume.  With the inclusion of 
ASVI the coefficient and power on ln views remains unchanged which supports the hypothesis 
that these variables measure different sources of volume.   Models presented in R3 and R4 
include lagged ln views.  We find that inclusion of lagged views results in a loss of significance 
for the current views measure, and when current views are not included, both the previous week, 
and two-week lags are positive and significant in predicting future abnormal volume.  In 
specification R5, we find that volume is not impacted by the change in views measure. 
                                                 
3 In untabulated results, controls for the number of analysts are added – the number of analysts is not significant, and 
the coefficients on the variables of interest remained substantively unchanged. 
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The estimated regression results for the control variables are generally consistent with the 
prior literature.   Standardized abnormal volume is positively related to NYSE volume, share 
turnover, the volatility index,  and a dummy for earnings reports.  It is positively related to the 
Amihud illiquidity measure, which reflects the fact that we measure standardized abnormal 
volume, not total volume.  The negative coefficient on firm market cap likewise reflects the fact 
that larger firms tend to have higher trading volume and liquidity, thus standardized abnormal 
trading volume will be lower.  
4.3 Views of Seeded Advertising Videos and Bid-Ask Spread 
Bid-Ask spread provides a measure of liquidity in a firm’s stock.  A larger spread 
indicates greater uncertainty in the pricing of the stock and less liquidity.  Combining ideas from 
the empirical literature discussed in (Grullon et al 2004),  and theoretical work (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985), we predict the advertising related increase in volume (from individual 
shareholders) documented in Table 4 will result in a decrease in bid-ask spread as the probability 
of trading against less informed individuals increases.  R1 shows a strongly significant and 
negative relationship between ln views of seeded advertising videos and bid ask spread. 
Specifications R2 and R3 present regressions with one and two week lagged natural log 
of views.  We find that the negative relation between bid ask spread and contemporaneous 
weekly natural log of views remains; and lagged views predict bid ask spread only in the absence 
of contemporaneous views. 
Specifications R4 and R5 demonstrate that ASVI does not have a significant impact on 
bid-ask spread when controls for Abnormal Volume are included in the regressions.  The 
positive coefficient suggests that it may increase bid-ask spread and be correlated with the 
trading activity of more sophisticated investors. R6 demonstrates that if the control for 
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Standardized Abnormal Volume is excluded that ASVI gains positive significance, suggesting a 
correlation between volume and ASVI.  This is consistent with the results we found in univariate 
regressions presented in Table 3, and suggests that ASVI and views of advertising videos shared 
on social media each represent the activity of a different “clientele,” or a different group of 
traders.   Social media views again appear to motivate trades of less informed individuals.   As 
we mentioned earlier, reports in the media suggest that high frequency traders have expanded 
their analysis to include twitter feeds and internet search trends.  If this practice is widespread 
during our relatively short sample period, it may explain the positive relation between ASVI and 
bid ask spread in found in our analysis, as more informed traders increasingly use internet search 
activity in high frequency trading algorithms.  This is discussed more fully in Section 4.4. 
R6 includes the change in views.  The change in views is consistent with the level of 
views, and is significantly and negatively related to bid-ask spread.   In untabulated robustness 
checks, we find similar results using Corwin and Schultz’s (2012) method to estimated bid ask 
spreads using daily data.   
In summary, the results of tests for the relation between views of seeded advertising 
videos on social media and the bid ask spread strongly support the hypothesis that the increase in 
trading volume we discuss in the prior section is driven by increased trading activity by 
individual investors rather than more informed institutional investors.  Based on the logic of 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985), we hypothesize that bid ask spreads narrow in response to 
increased trading activity by individuals.  This is because adverse selection costs decrease when 
the probability of trading with less informed investors is higher.   
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The control variables again have estimated coefficients that are generally consistent with 
the existing literature.  Larger firms have smaller spreads.  Spreads increase with volatility, 
earnings reports, turnover, illiquidity, and dispersion of analyst opinion.    
4.4 ASVI and Individual Investors 
Da, et al (2012) test the significance of SVI and its impact on individual shareholders 
using market level data to measure the share purchases of individuals. Table 5 specifically 
examines the impact of the level of ASVI on bid-ask spread and finds it marginally positively 
related to bid-ask spread in the absence of controls for abnormal volume.  The expected sign for 
this relationship given the results of the Da, et al paper would be negative.  The results of their 
paper imply that larger ASVI would result in a smaller spread as this would demonstrate the 
presence of individual shareholders. 
To explore this further, we test the impact of ASVI on our sample firms in the Da, et al 
time period (2004-2008) and in our time period (2009-2011).  The results are presented in Table 
5a.  The Da, et al paper compares changes in ASVI to changes in individual orders at the trading 
center level.  To most closely replicate this we compare the changes in ASVI  to the  changes in 
bid-ask spread.  Specification R1 shows that consistent with Da, et al this result is negative and 
significant for the extended sample (1/1/2004-12/31/2011).   This result indicates that an increase 
in ASVI is associated with a contemporaneous decrease in spread, consistent with prior analyses 
of individual investor trading activity and stock price dynamics. 
Specification R2 includes dummy variables such that SM time period dummy equals one 
for the dates in our sample period (7/2009-12/31/11) and the Da, et al time period dummy equals 
one during the time period explored in their paper (1/1/2004-6/2008).  The spread during the SM 
time period is marginally larger than the Da time period.   
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Specification R3 includes an interaction term between the time period dummy variables 
and the change is ASVI.  The estimated coefficients for both interaction terms are significantly 
positive.  But, the estimated coefficient for the interaction of the later time period with the 
change in ASVI is much larger in magnitude than that of the earlier Da time period.  This larger 
positive spread is consistent with the hypothesis that ASVI is less correlated with individual 
trader activity in our sample time period than in the Da, et al time period.   
As discussed above, reports in the media suggest that high frequency traders have 
expanded their analysis to include twitter feeds and internet search trends.  If this practice is 
widespread during our relatively short sample period, it may contribute to the positive relation 
between ASVI and bid ask spread in found in our analysis, as more informed traders increasingly 
use internet search activity in high frequency trading algorithms.   
4.5 Views of Seeded Advertising Videos and Excess Returns 
In the multivariate regression analysis, we use multiple measures of excess returns.  
These all are based on the firm’s return less the return for the S&P500 for the same time period.    
The results are presented in Table 6.  In the first specification, returns are measured in the 
contemporaneous week, and the coefficient on the change in the log of views is positive and 
significant at the 5% level suggesting that higher contemporaneous increase in individual 
investor attention is associated with higher returns.  Specification R2 presents cumulative excess 
returns measured for the next two weeks (t+1, t+2) this shows that the positive excess returns are 
reversed over the next two weeks as the coefficient is negative and identical to the one week 
gains in R1; but is only marginally insignificant with a p-value of 0.115. 
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Specifications R3 shows returns over the next 22 weeks and the coefficient is quite small 
and insignificant. These results suggest that a temporary increase in views has a positive impact 
on price that reverses over the subsequent two weeks.   
Results for the control variables show that the earnings dummy is not significantly related 
to excess returns.  NYSE volume and the illiquidity measure are positively related to excess 
returns in some specifications, while volatility is negatively related to excess returns in all 
specifications.   
4.6 Summary of Main Results 
Interpreting these results related to excess returns together with the previous two sections 
focusing on volume and spreads, the evidence generally suggests that views are correlated with 
increased volume and lower bid ask spread.   The contemporaneous increase in price may be the 
result of insufficient supply to meet the increased demand in the short-term.  The negative 
relation in the subsequent two-weeks is the reversal of the price pressure. 
ASVI seems to measure a different source of volume than the Views measure does, as 
both ASVI and Views are significant in the same specifications.  Firms with the most views and 
volume have the narrowest spread; while level of ASVI is positively related to spread.  Further, 
the correlation of ASVI with individual investors is diminished in our time period when 
compared to the time period of the earlier study.  These results are somewhat different from the 
results and interpretation presented by Da, et al (2011), and we suggest that the difference may 
be driven by the later time period and adaptive trading strategies of high frequency traders.  
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4.7 What Drives Views of Seeded Advertising Videos? 
Table 4 implies that social media based advertising increases abnormal volume.  Table 5 
shows a negative relation views of seeded advertising videos and in the bid-ask spread.    In 
Table 6 we find a short term increase in share price related to the change in views and a reversal 
over the next two weeks.  These results are broadly consistent with the earlier empirical studies 
of advertising and stock price dynamics, and investor attention and stock price dynamics. 
The purpose of seeding advertising videos on the internet is to increase visibility of the 
firm and its products.   But, what drives views?  Table 7 examines determinants of social media 
seeded advertising views.  One advantage of seeded advertising videos is that it is an inexpensive 
way to reach customers.  While our sample may not be representative of all firms using social 
media based advertising, this idea is supported by the fact that advertising expenditure is not 
significant in any specification in Table 7.  The results support the hypothesis that it is the 
number of views of the videos, not the number of advertising dollars that matters. 
Market Capitalization is not significant.  Views are significantly positively related to the 
natural log of revenue (measured in the same quarter as the weekly viewing activity).  The 
natural log of firm level weekly views are also positively related to higher levels of mean 
viewing activity in the sample as a whole. 
It is interesting though, that when lagged views are placed in the specification (R2 
through R4); they remain significant for at least two weeks. This suggests that videos which 
become popular in one week are likely to become even more popular in the following week or 
that firms who run a successful campaign are likely to run other successful campaigns.  This 
result can be interpreted to mean that there is some residual benefit to having the “hot” marketing 
campaign that is not captured in advertising spending.   
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4.8 Views of Seeded Advertising Videos and Google Search Volume 
We find no significant correlation between Views and ASVI with a correlation of  -.0046 
(p-value .6575).  Table 8 further examines the relation between Google ASVI and views.  The 
results suggest that views of seeded advertising videos do not drive search volume, and search 
volume does not drive seeded advertising videos.  Neither is significantly related to the other 
contemporaneously, or up to two lags.   
5.  Conclusion 
Our unique database of views of social media advertising videos allows us to measure 
investor attention and the direct impact of advertising on excess returns and volume in the 
framework suggested by Merton (1987).  We use a measure of viewing activity and attention of 
individuals, linked to specific controlled messages produced by firms.  We compare our measure 
to the closest measure, Google ASVI and find that our measure contains different information; 
and appears to more directly reflect the attention of individual investors in our sample time 
period. 
We demonstrate that views of seeded advertising videos shared on social media 
positively impact trading volume. Views have a significant and negative impact on bid-ask 
spreads, even when controlling for a price impact measure of liquidity.  This is consistent with an 
increase in liquidity as market makers decrease spreads in response to a higher probability of 
trading against less informed individual investors.  We find evidence of a short term increase in 
price due to the change in social media views which is reversed in the following two weeks.  Our 
analysis shows a direct link between attention to product market advertising activity and stock 
price dynamics which has not been examined in the prior literature.   
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7.0 TabOes
Table 1.1- Summary Statistics
Panel A
Number of Firms 75
4 Digit SIC Codes 53
2 Digit SIC Codes 26
Panel B
Mean Median S.D. Max Min
Weekly Volume 56.7MM 2.25MM 97.2MM 1.1B 2,100
Weekly Views 170,838         3,633 894,906 4.9MM -                  
SVI 59.23 64 25 100 0
ASVI -0.001 0 0.346 4.03 (4)                    
Ammihud Illiquidity 0.0799605 0.0001482 1.110417 46.07755 (6)                    
Share Turn 60.91 46.42 57.91 986.37 -                  
Price 76.8               32.4              228.7            2,660.0                         -  
Contemporaneous Weekly  ExcessRet -0.0002 0.0000 0.0408 0.44241 -0.709
Two-week Excess Ret -0.00123 0.00115 0.0818 0.97917 -0.78976
Proportional Spread 0.0347           0.0280          0.0282          0.0597           0.0043            
Market Cap ($B) 41.10             1.10              62.70            392 1.47
Total Assets ($MM) 79,639.00 21,096.80 177,669.60 1,313,867.00 46.5
Annual Revenue ($MM) 41,123.60 18,435.00 62,552.90 444,948.00 119.6
Advertising Expense($MM) 1,188             695               1,446 9,315.00        4
Number of Analysts 17.61 17.00 11.41 54.00 1.00
Dispersion 0.11 0.03 0.36 7.00 0.00
Panel C
2009 2010 2011
Mean Weekly Views ( if > 0) 166,351         252,554        251,492        
Median Weekly Views  (if > 0) 45,365           61,466          61,100          
Max Weekly Views (firm) 2.7MM 49MM 33MM
Total Views 111MM 878MM 895MM

Table 1.2 - Univariate Regressions
Dependent Variable
Univariate Panel A R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9
Change in Ln Views 0.0012 247892 -.010218
Ln Views -0.003468 820196* 0.02076***
ASVI 0.06337** -442661 .19622**
# Observations 9224 9299 9299 9224 9299 9299 9224 9299 9299
Firm/Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters (firms) 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
R-sq 0.0325 0.0722          0.0611      0.0223 0.0002      0.0001      0.032 0.0096      0.0048      
significant at ***1%, ** 5% and *10% level, respectively
Dependent Variable is Bid-Ask Spread Estimate Dependent Variable is Contemporaneous Excess Return
Univariate Panel B R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3
Change in Ln Views -0.01033* 0.0006**
Ln Views -0.00930** -0.0003**
Da, et al ASVI .10261** 0.0016
# Observations 9224 9299 9299 9224 9299 9224
Firm/Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Clusters (firms) 75 75 75 75 75 75
R-sq 0.0011      0.0878            0.0027          0.0001 0.0038 0.0001
significant at ***1%, ** 5% and *10% level, respectively significant at ***1%, ** 5% and *10% level, respectively
Dependent Variable is subsequent two-week Excess Return
Univariate Panel D R1 R2 R3
Change in Ln Views -0.0062
Ln_Views -0.0007***
Change in ASVI -0.0177
Observations 9224 9299 9224
Firm/Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES
Number of permno 75 75 75
R-squared 0.0001 0.0038 0.0000
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
# Observations
Firm/Week Fixed Effects
Clusters (firms)
R-sq
Change in Ln Views
Ln_Views
Change in ASVI
Univariate Panel C
These Univariate regressions of Ln Social Media Views, Change in Views (t, t-1) and ASVI are fixed effects panel regressions clustered at the firm level and the standard 
errors are estimated using Huber-White estimators to account for heteroscdasticity and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
Ln Volume Abnormal Volume Abnormal Volume
Standardized

Table 1.3 - Difference in Means/Medians 
Panel A - Sample firms observations with SM Views vs Firms without SM Exposure
Non SM Non SM
SM Users Matching firm SM Users Matching firm
5645 obs 11,279 obs t-value 5645 obs 11,279 obs Chi2 p-value
Share Turnover 60.7637 51.8304 9.26 *** 45.5668 35.5674 306.030 0.0000 ***
Standardized Abnormal Vol 0.0411 -0.0383 4.69 *** -0.0992 -0.2592 116.841 0.0000 ***
Bid Ask Spread 0.0325 0.0161 55.23 *** 0.0258 0.0140 0.102 0.7500
Contemporaneous Return -0.00091 0.00086 1.87 ** 0.00000 0.00000 1.559 0.2120
Panel B - Sample firms with and without SM Exposure
Sample firms Sample firms
SM Users Pre-SM usage SM Users Pre-SM usage
5645 obs 3654 obs t-value 5645 obs 3654 obs Chi2 p-value
Share Turnover 60.7637 61.1353 0.30 45.5668 48.4269 9.662 0.0020 ***
Standardized Abnormal Vol 0.0411 -0.0634 5.05 *** -0.0992 -0.1252 1.824 0.1770
Bid Ask Spread 0.0325 0.0381 9.47 *** 0.0258 0.0316 158.206 0.0000 ***
Weekly Excess Returns (%) -0.00091 0.00155 3.01 *** 0.00000 0.00000 0.002 0.9680
Panel A presents comparison of our sample firms with a 93 firm Non-Social Media matching portfolio matched on industry, 
size, trading volume and market capitalization.  Panel B compares two subsets of our sample.  The first is firms once they begin 
using Social Media and the other is the same firms pre-entry into the social media sample
Means Medians
Means Medians
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Table 1.4 - Views and Volume
Dependent Variable is
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Ln Views 0.0307*** 0.0307*** 0.0053
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.5220]
Change in Views -0.0081
[0.2384]
Da, et al ASVI 0.1170***
[0.0020]
Ln ViewsLag1 0.0096 0.0142*
[0.2600] [0.0717]
Ln ViewsLag2 0.0158** 0.0163**
[0.0255] [0.0233]
Ln NYSE Volume 0.1183*** 0.1154*** 0.1605*** 0.1607*** 0.1173***
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001]
Ln Firm Market Cap -0.3460*** -0.3453*** -0.3453*** -0.3452*** -0.3416***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Ln Share Turnover 1.4791*** 1.4753*** 1.4759*** 1.4758*** 1.4655***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Ln CBOE Volatility Index 0.1752*** 0.1783*** 0.1792*** 0.1791*** 0.1927***
[0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0006]
Dummy for Earnings 0.1805*** 0.1784*** 0.1982*** 0.1985*** 0.1937***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [5.43]
Amihud Illiquidity 0.0361*** 0.0358*** 0.0516*** 0.0516*** 0.0492***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Ln Dispersion -0.012 -0.0123 -0.0069 -0.0068 -0.0027
[0.9329] [0.9310] [0.9617] [0.9627] [0.9855]
Constant -3.1225*** -3.0726*** -3.9441*** -3.9465*** -2.9761***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Observations 9299 9299 9149 9149 9224
Number of permno 75 75 75 75 75
Firm/Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.4731 0.4748 0.5024 0.5023 0.48
Robust p-values in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Standardized Abnormal Volume
This panel contains two-way fixed effects panel regression using clustered robust standard errors,  The dependent 
variable is Standardized 52-week abnormal volume calculated as volume demeaned by the 52-week average then 
deflated by the standard deviation of the 52 week abnormal volume observations.  Standard errors are estimated 
using Huber-White estimators to account for heteroscdasticity and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 1.5  - Impact on Bid-Ask Spread
Dependent Variable is Ln Bid-Ask Spread Estimate
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7
Log_Views -0.0060*** -0.0064** -0.0060***
[0.0007] [0.0185] [0.0007]
Da, et al ASVI 0.0162 0.0163 0.0271*
[0.2705] [0.2707] [0.0862]
Change in Ln_Views (t-1, t) -0.0043*
[0.0890]
LogViewsLag1 -0.0001 -0.0056**
[0.9694] [0.0311]
LogViewsLag2 0.0022 0.0016
[0.4144] [0.5470]
STD_52WABV 0.0949*** 0.1157*** 0.1156*** 0.0944*** 0.0905*** 0.1063***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Log_NYSE 0.0058 -0.0154 -0.0157 0.0054 0.005 0.0158 0.0059
[0.6641] [0.2694] [0.2615] [0.6805] [0.7021] [0.2403] [0.6491]
Log_MktCap -0.0470*** -0.0397*** -0.0399*** -0.0470*** -0.0492*** -0.0801*** -0.0439***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Log_ShareTurn 0.2780*** 0.2472*** 0.2476*** 0.2782*** 0.2866*** 0.4188*** 0.2636***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
log_CBOE 0.6020*** 0.5953*** 0.5955*** 0.6026*** 0.6016*** 0.6185*** 0.5938***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Dummy for earnings 0.1610*** 0.1501*** 0.1497*** 0.1608*** 0.1617*** 0.1778*** 0.1547***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
AMMOD 0.0203*** 0.0177*** 0.0178*** 0.0203*** 0.0205*** 0.0237*** 0.0184***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Ln_dispersion 0.1410*** 0.1210** 0.1208** 0.1410*** 0.1406*** 0.1396** 0.1305**
[0.0089] [0.0195] [0.0196] [0.0090] [0.0087] [0.0174] [0.0119]
Constant -5.8244*** -5.4047*** -5.4022*** -5.8189*** -5.8425*** -6.1151*** -5.8381***
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
Observations 9299 9149 9149 9299 9299 9299 9224
Number of permno 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
Firm/Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.4298 0.4382 0.4379 0.43 0.4281 0.4076 0.4351
Robust p-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In this two-way fixed effects panel regression the depdendent variable is proporational bid-ask spread.  Clustered Robust Standard Errors are estimated using Huber-White estimators to account 
for heteroscdasticity and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 1.5a  - Comparison of ASVI across time periods
R1 R2 R3
Dependent Variable is Change in Ln Bid-Ask Spread Estimate (t-1,t)
Change in Da, et al ASVI (t-1,t) -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.178***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.005]
Interaction SM Dummy*Δ ASVI 0.289***
[0.000]
Interaction DA Dummy*Δ ASVI 0.127**
[0.040]
SM Time Period Dummy -0.043*** -0.042***
[0.000] [0.000]
Da, et al Time Period Dummy -0.046*** -0.045***
[0.000] [0.000]
Ln NYSE Volume -0.161*** -0.169*** -0.169***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ln Firm Market Cap -0.032*** -0.029** -0.029**
[0.005] [0.014] [0.014]
Ln Share Turnover -0.190*** -0.189*** -0.189***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Ln CBOE Volatility Index 0.118*** 0.100*** 0.101***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Amihud Illiquidity 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
[0.554] [0.568] [0.580]
Constant 4.110*** 4.324*** 4.324***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 30200 30200 30200
Number of firms 75 75 75
Firm/Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES
R-squared 0.069 0.069 0.071
Robust p-values in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
This two way fixed effects panel regression uses our sample firms in a time period that extended to 1/1/2004-
12/31/2011 to include the Da et al (2012).  The periods are non-overlapping.  For observations with dates in the 
Da, et all time period the DA Dummy-1.  For observations in our sample period the SM dummy=1.  Clustered 
robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White estimators to account for heteroscdasticity and are 
adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 1.6 - Impact on Excess Returns 
R1 R2 R3
Contemporaneous Excess Returns Excess Ret
Excess Return Weeks 2 and 3 Weeks 4-26
change_LnViews 0.0006** -0.0006 -0.0014
[0.0310] [0.1157] [0.2911]
Log_NYSE 0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0153**
[0.4413] [0.8057] [0.0344]
Log_MktCap -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0029
[0.6539] [0.8321] [0.2743]
Log_ShareTurn 0.0005 0.0009 0.0061
[0.7151] [0.8292] [0.6099]
log_CBOE -0.0031* -0.0034 0.012
[0.0655] [0.4531] [0.6094]
Dummy for earnings -0.0004 0.0003 -0.004
[0.8485] [0.9156] [0.1701]
Amishud Illiquidity -0.0003*** 0.0003 0.0012
[0.0047] [0.2393] [0.1437]
Ln_dispersion 0.0060** 0.0094** 0.068
[0.0162] [0.0348] [0.2511]
Constant -0.0147 0.024 0.2714*
[0.6279] [0.6939] [0.0529]
Observations 9224 9149 9074
Firm/Week Fixed Effect
Number of Permno 75 75 75
R-squared 0.0013 0.001 0.0061
Robust p-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable is Return in Excess of S&P500
This two-way fixed effects panel regression uses Excess returns (Rm-Rf)  as the dependent 
variable.   Clustered robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White estimators to 
account for heteroscdasticity and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 1.7  - Determinants of Seeded Advertising Video Viewing Activity
R1 R2 R3 R4
Ln Advertising Expenditure (t-1) 1.3391 0.1528 0.2733 0.1533
[0.3844] [0.1667] [0.1963] [0.1746]
Ln Lag 1 Social Media Views 0.9302*** 0.8737***
[0.0000] [0.0000]
Ln Lag 2 Social Media Views 0.8755*** 0.0591**
[0.0000] [0.0454]
Ln Market Capitalization -0.1303 0.0194 0.0482 0.0217
[0.7907] [0.6232] [0.5194] [0.5900]
Ln Revenue 7.6280*** 0.4151** 0.7360** 0.3762**
[0.0029] [0.0156] [0.0273] [0.0404]
Standandized Mean Views in Sample 0.4368*** 0.0478*** 0.0757*** 0.0457***
[0.0000] [0.0038] [0.0071] [0.0072]
Dummy for earnings -0.1792*** 0.003 0.0102 0.0063
[0.0070] [0.9475] [0.8691] [0.8934]
-134.8253*** -8.6740*** -15.6257*** -8.0884***
[0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0006]
Observations 7047 6989 6931 6931
Firm/Week Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of permno 61 61 61 61
R-squared 0.1303 0.8857 0.8003 0.8839
Robust p-values in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable is Ln(Views)
 This table presents a two-way fixed-effects panel regression.  Advertising is measured as of the end of the 
previous quarter.  Results are robust to an alternate definiton of advertising dollars using prior year-end 
advertising expenses.  Clustered Robust standard errors are estimated using Huber-White estimators to account 
for heteroscdasticity and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 1.8 - Test of Interdependence of SVI and Views
Dependent Variable Ln_Views Ln_Views Ln_Views ASVI ASVI ASVI
Da, et al ASVI 0.0442
[0.4432]
ASVI Lag 1 0.0274
[0.6217]
ASVI Lag 2 0.0012
[0.9820]
Ln_Views 0.0005
[0.4294]
Ln_Views Lag 1 0.0003
[0.6157]
Ln_Views Lag 2 0.0002
[0.6934]
Constant 6.3123*** 6.3419*** 6.3724*** -0.0044 -0.0032 -0.0028
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.2548] [0.3830] [0.4351]
Observations 9299 9224 9149 9299 9224 9149
Number of permno 75 75 75 75 75 75
Firm/Week Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Robust p-statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
In models not reported, results are robust to controls for revenue, advertising, earnings announcements and market capitalization.  Clustered robust standard errors are 
estimated using Huber-White estimators to account for heteroscdasticity and are adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Grantor Types and MLS versus Non-MLS Price Effects 
 
1. Introduction 
A Multiple Listing Service (MLS) is a service provided to customers of real estate 
brokers.  It provides pooled information on listings from member brokers.   For sellers, access to 
a MLS can be provided as part of a bundled service which includes representation by an agent, or 
as an unbundled service in the case of a flat fee or discount broker.  The MLS allows potential 
buyers the opportunity to search for available properties based on location, price, quality, and 
features, and also to find prices of comparable properties.  This service reduces market frictions 
related to geography, communication, and information by increasing the ‘visibility’ of properties 
for sale to potential buyers.  This can improve the likelihood of finding a match, the quality of 
the match, and also reduce the time it takes to find the match.  Alternative means of advertising 
properties are available to sellers who choose to sell outside the MLS system, but the effort of 
selling is more directly borne by the seller.   
The question of the value of a MLS and access to a MLS has become an important 
question, as activity in the real estate market is a key factor in the economy.  While this 
clearinghouse of information can reduce market frictions, it is possible that the pervasive power 
of a MLS could give undue market influence to member brokers, and impose unfair restraints on 
trade (Austin 1970).  The DOJ recognizing this possibility has encouraged open access to MLS 
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listings for a flat fee or without broker participation4.  Yinger’s (1981) theoretical analysis 
suggests significant efficiency gains from the MLS; but argues that these may be offset by the 
costs of broker market power if exclusionary practices are allowed.  On the other hand, Uri 
(1985) argues that MLS systems are so valuable that certain exclusionary practices are 
justifiable.  This is because member brokers will have incentive to maintain the MLS only if it 
offers them some potential profit.   
Previous research on the value of MLS listing and brokerage services to sellers has shown 
mixed results.  Frew and Jud (1986) present empirical evidence that MLS listed properties obtain 
higher sale prices (approximately 3% higher) than non MLS sales.  They argue that rational 
buyers are willing to pay a portion of the brokerage costs if the brokerage services makes it 
easier to find a match and easier to complete the transaction.  Conversely, Yavas and Colwell 
(1995) find that properties sold through a MLS sell at a lower price than similar properties sold 
directly by the owner (FSBO) or through a non-MLS participant broker.  The explanation for this 
result hinges on the fact that lower prices have two competing effects upon broker effort.  First, 
lower prices result in lower commissions, giving brokers decreased incentive to exert effort.  
But, lower prices increase the probability of a sale occurring, and this has a positive effect on 
broker effort, for both the listing broker, and other brokers participating in the MLS.  Yavas and 
Colwell (1995) indicate that their results “cannot explain the widespread use of the MLS” and 
recommend additional research to examine other factors that may affect the marketing choice. 
The papers discussed above examine the impact of the MLS prior to the time when 
individuals were generally able to access MLS listings independently using personal computers.  
The majority of recent MLS properties are listed on the Internet.  Ford, Rutherford and Yavas 
                                                 
4 See DOJ letter to Governor Matt Blount, MO 5/23/2005 where the DOJ lays out their case advocating unbundling 
of real estate services including flat or low fee access to MLS listing. 
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(2005) indicate that 93% of the MLS listings in their data from 1999 listed on the internet and 
those that listed received a 1.93% price premium while taking 11% longer to sell.5  Ford, 
Rutherford and Yavas (2005) argue that buyers find a better match, value the house higher and 
pay a higher transaction price.  More recently, Hendel, Nevo and Ortalo-Magné, (2009) find that 
MLS sales prices and For-Sale-by-Owner (FSBO) prices are similar before considering listing 
and commission costs, but MLS properties sold more quickly, and had a higher probability of 
selling.  In their sample, both the MLS and FSBO properties were available on the Internet. 
Other studies address the impact of brokers and agents, and also find mixed results.   
Doiron, Shilling and Sirmans (1985) find that brokered properties sell at a higher price compared 
to owner sales, and estimate that approximately 43% of the brokerage commission is capitalized.  
Kamath and Yantek (1982) and Colwell et al., (1992) find that brokers do not impact the selling 
price of a house.  In a specialized dataset of homes on Stanford University owned land, 
Bernheim and Meer (2013) examine real estate brokerage services when listing is unbundled 
from other broker services.  Their study finds that use of a broker is associated with a reduction 
in sales price ranging from 5.9% to 7.7%.  Bernheim and Meer also find weak evidence that use 
of a broker reduces initial list price and time on the market.  Rutherford, Springer and Yavas 
(2005), Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2007) and Levitt, et al (2008) find that agent-owned 
properties sell at a premium which can potentially be attributed to agent market knowledge and 
patience.  Similarly, Huang and Rutherford (2007) find that National Association of Realtor 
(NAR) member REALTOR’s sell properties at a small premium over non-NAR members.  
Overall, the evidence related to brokers and agents is mixed. However, the results suggest agent 
                                                 
5 In a sample of 300,000 listings from the Dallas/Fort Worth Metroplex, 97.6% of listings are also posted on the 
Internet. 
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involvement does affect the terms of real estate transactions, but not always in ways that benefit 
the sellers who interact with them. 
In this study we use data from the years 2004-2005, a time period with moderate (4%) 
year-on-year growth.  We identify sales in the MLS and outside the MLS for individual grantors 
and other grantors, including corporations, LLCs, builders, and financial firms.  We find that 
properties sold through a MLS sell at higher prices. This is consistent with Doiron, Shilling and 
Sirmans (1985) and the findings of Frew and Jud (1986), and their suggestion that buyers are 
willing to pay more in return for a better match and smoother completion of the transaction.   
Decomposing our results by seller-type we find that individuals receive a price premium when 
they sell a property through a MLS.  However other grantors, in this paper referred to as “not-
individual-owners (NIO),” as a group, receive the same price for the property if sold through or 
outside a MLS. This suggests that for individual sellers, the ability of the MLS to reduce market 
frictions is valuable.  For NIOs, there are other means of marketing properties that substitute for 
listing in the MLS.  Different NIO sellers may select different selling strategies, for example, 
some bank owned real estate is auctioned, while new construction is often sold through a builder 
website or on site sales center.  In the next section, we discuss the data, in the third section we 
present the results and a fourth section offers concluding remarks and some comments on future 
research. 
2.  Data and Sample Construction 
 The sample includes 25,512 single family residential properties that were sold in Dallas 
County during the January 1, 2004 - May 31, 2005 time period.  We make use of three data sets 
to arrive at a final sample.  In Texas, each county appraisal district is required to provide a file to 
the Texas Comptroller’s office with all known property transactions completed during the prior 
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year.  The chief appraiser for each district verifies that all known property transactions are 
included in the file submitted to the Comptroller’s office.  In recent years, the Texas 
Comptroller’s office redacts all personal information (names), property location, and sales data 
before the files are available to the public.  In the initial years, this data is available in a limited 
number of files.  We were able to obtain the Dallas county file for 2005 that contained name, 
property address, sales price, Tax ID, and sales date along with a number of other fields for most 
of 2004 and five months in 2005.   
 For this study, we first drop all properties not identified as single family residences and 
all observations with missing data for any of the fields listed above.  Next, we use the Dallas 
Appraisal District file and confirm that a property has a match in the Dallas Appraisal District 
file for 2005.  Properties without a matching TAX ID or property address match in the Dallas 
County Appraisal District files are removed from the sample.     
 To identify MLS sales, we then match actual MLS sales for the years 2004 and 2005 in 
Dallas County by TAX ID and property address.  Any property without a MLS match is 
rechecked to verify that we have a correct match with the appraisal district, and that there is no 
match in the MLS using TAX ID or property address.  All properties thus verified are classified 
as a non-MLS sale. These properties may be sales by owners; properties sold through an agent, 
but not listed on the MLS; or properties sold by other entities or firms.  Variable names and data 
descriptions are provided in Table 1. 
 Data available from either the Comptroller’s file or the Dallas County Appraisal database 
include physical property characteristics; age, building square feet, pool, number of bedrooms, 
bathrooms, fireplaces, stories, deck, sprinkler and land square feet; and marketability 
characteristics; condition/desirability/utility (CDU) rating, land percentage, land value, 
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depreciation percentage, and building class assigned by the appraisal district.   The Dallas 
County Appraisal database also contains neighborhood controls that we include as fixed effects 
in the models.  Calendar information includes the year and the month of sale.  The selling price 
and date sold is provided in the Comptroller’s data for both the MLS sales and the non-MLS 
sales.  While there is a field for “days on the market”, this field is blank for all properties. In the 
data we assign a value of “1” for houses listed and sold on the MLS and a “0” for single family 
houses that were not sold through the MLS.   Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the data 
broken out by whether the property is sold as a MLS sale or a non-MLS sale.  In our sample, 
approximately 14.6% of the transactions consist of non-MLS sales. This is marginally lower than 
the National Association of Realtor’s estimate that approximately 20% of transactions are sold 
without an agent.  
A comparison of the two sub-samples indicates that a majority of the twenty-nine 
variables displayed are statistically different for MLS properties compared to non-MLS 
properties at either a 1% or 5% level of significance.  The comparison of sub-samples using a 
difference in means test suggests that MLS properties have lower prices, are smaller and older, 
with fewer bedrooms and bathrooms, and slightly higher land square footage, and are less likely 
to have either a “Poor” or “Excellent” Condition/Desirability/Utility (CDU) rating by the Dallas 
Appraisal District.  NIOs that are presumably better informed represent a greater percentage of 
non-MLS sales.  Builders make up 12.6% of non-MLS sales versus 1.3% of MLS sales; this is 
consistent with the finding that properties sold outside of the MLS are larger, newer, and have 
smaller lot sizes.  Estates and LP’s are also more likely to sell non-MLS.  But, financial firms 
(likely foreclosures) sell a greater proportion through the MLS (7.9% of MLS sales versus 3.2% 
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non-MLS sales).  Individual owners represent a greater proportion of the MLS subsample 
(86.4%) participants than of the non-MLS subsample (78.7%). 
 We also estimate a probit model (Table 3) to examine the likelihood that different 
property characteristics influence the decision to sell using the MLS or to sell outside an MLS.  
The dummy variable takes a value of “1” if the property is sold via a MLS.   Consistent with the 
results presented in Table 2, larger properties are less likely to be listed on the MLS, while older 
properties are more likely to have an MLS listing.  A property with a Poor CDU rating, 
ownership by a builder, an estate, a corporation or a limited partnership has a lower probability 
of selling through a MLS.  Properties listed by financial firms and properties with higher CDU 
ratings have a higher estimated likelihood of selling through a MLS.  The results from the probit 
model are generally consistent with the results from the differences in means tests. 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1 MLS versus Non-MLS  
 In this section, we estimate a selling price model as follows: 
ln (SPi) = β0 + β1 MLS +  βi Xi  εi                                                           
(1) 
The results are presented in Table 4.  In Model 1 we only include the MLS dummy and 
neighborhood fixed effects and year month dummies.  In the 2nd model, the vector Xi includes 
housing characteristics.  Model 3 adds CDU dummy variables and Model 4 adds grantor type 
dummy variables as indicated in Table 1 and Tables 4-6 with individuals as the baseline category 
in Tables 4 & 5 and Company as the baseline category in Table 6.   With only year/month 
controls and neighborhood fixed effects, it appears that selling through a MLS results in a 
premium of 2.4%.  But once we add physical property characteristics and CDU controls, the 
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coefficient drops to 0.5% and is not significant.  Therefore, after controlling for property 
condition/utility/desirability and physical characteristics, this data shows no premium or discount 
to listing on a MLS. 
 However, when we control for the influence of different grantors we identify a significant 
difference in price from selling through a MLS.  Given the results from the differences in means 
test and the probit model results, we expected the ownership type to influence the results.  Some 
NIO grantors, for example builders, include marketing their properties as part of their business 
model.  Because new properties tend to show well and sell for higher price per square foot, 
minimizing commission based payments to real estate agents is important to maintain 
profitability.  Thus, we expect that grantors select into or out of the MLS depending upon 
whether they have substitute marketing platforms.  After adding controls for different grantors, 
holding out individual sellers as the control, the premium for listing on a MLS is now 1.7% and 
significant at the 1% level.6  This can be directly interpreted as a premium for individual sellers 
who list and sell through a MLS.7  Assuming a 5% commission, about 34% of the commission is 
capitalized, similar to the approximately 43% capitalization of the brokerage commission 
estimated by Doiron, Shilling and Sirmans (1985).  
 The results for the other variables are generally as expected.  Houses sell for higher prices 
when they are larger, builder-owned, owned by a LP, have a pool, a deck, a larger lot, or have 
more bathrooms or bedrooms.  Discounts to the selling price are evident for properties that are 
older, have a higher percentage of value from the land rather than the house, or are sold by an 
                                                 
6 In untabulated results, if grantor type controls are added to model 1, the MLS coefficient is approximately 4.27%.  
It is approximately 1.8% for Model 2 and is statistically significant at 1%. 
 
7 As Yavas and Colwell (1995) indicate, since we are unable to observe a non-MLS price for a house sold through 
the MLS or a MLS price for a house that sold outside the MLS, possible sample selection bias may influence the 
results.  Following their procedure, we estimate an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) from the probit model and include it in 
Model 4. The IMR is statistically insignificant indicating no sample selection bias in this sample of non-MLS and 
MLS transactions. 
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estate, a financial firm, or FHLM.  It is likely that the financial firm and FHLM properties are 
bank-owned or foreclosure properties, which may explain the discount.  In addition, properties 
with a CDU rating of Poor or Fair sell for less than the average house while properties with a 
CDU rating of Good, Very Good or Excellent sell for higher prices than the average house as 
expected.  
3.2 Individual Owners and Other Grantors  
 We next split the sample into individual homeowners and other grantors (NIO).  Table 5 
provides results based on a sample of 21,614 individual grantors, excluding the NIO sales.  
Estimated coefficients for physical characteristics and CDU ratings are similar to those in the full 
sample, with signs as expected.  In each model in Table 5, the coefficient for MLS is positive 
and significant.  The regression adjusted R2’s range between .899 and .950.  The estimated 
coefficient on the MLS indicator in Model 3 with the full set of controls is 1.8%, approximately 
the same as Model 4 for the complete sample in Table 4.  Individuals receive approximately 
1.8% more when they sell their houses through a MLS relative to houses sold outside the MLS.   
In Table 6, we limit the sample to grantors other than individual homeowners, i.e. NIO.  
The estimated coefficient on the MLS dummy is positive but not statistically significant.  
Therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis that B1=0.   These results indicate that grantors 
other than individuals obtain the same price (no premium or discount) if they sell through the 
MLS or outside the MLS.  It is possible that the grantors who are not individuals sell a 
significantly higher volume8 of properties, giving them a level of expertise and familiarity with 
marketing strategies that are used to compensate when they sell outside of the MLS.  Individual 
owners typically sell single-family residences less frequently, so the effect of the MLS listing on 
                                                 
8 The median number of sales by NIOs is 6 properties. 
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marketing efforts has a greater effect on sales prices.  In other words, if individuals choose to sell 
outside of the MLS, they expect to sell at a lower price, but NIO grantors do not. 
Evidence suggesting that individual homeowners obtain a price premium by selling 
through the MLS indicates that a MLS is a valuable service.  We use the following example to 
examine the net cash flow to the individual seller using the MLS or selling outside the MLS.  If 
an individual sells a property in the MLS for $178,873, the mean in this data set, they could 
expect to sell it for about $175,653 outside the MLS assuming the 1.8% premium for MLS sales 
before any transaction costs.  If sold through the MLS, the seller would typically pay 
approximately 5 to 6% of the price in commission costs if MLS access is bundled with other 
listing agent services.  Assuming a full two-sided commission of 5%9, the seller would receive 
$169,929 after paying the commission.  The difference in the net selling price from selling 
through a MLS and the selling price expected from selling outside the MLS, is $5,724 ($175,653 
expected outside a MLS minus $169,929 net through a MLS), or 3.2% of the MLS selling price.  
The results are consistent with Frew and Jud’s (1986) estimate of a price premium 
associated with listing in a MLS and the argument that buyers find a better match and thus have a 
higher value for the house and pay a higher transaction price.  We estimate that grantees buying 
through a MLS pay approximately 1.8% more for a property purchased through a MLS than a 
property purchased outside a MLS, with the net effect that buyers pay part of the seller’s 
commission.   
If the property sold outside the MLS we would expect the net to the seller to be $175,653 
minus any costs incurred in marketing and selling the property.  If individual marketing effort 
costs less than $5,724 outside a MLS, then the individual seller is better off selling their property 
                                                 
9 The mean buyer’s agent commission for the MLS properties in the dataset is approximately 3%.   The latest 
published data on commission rates suggest a rate of approximately 5 percent overall. See Weicher (2006). 
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outside the MLS, and without a full service listing agent.  Levitt, Syerson and Ferreira (2008) 
estimate the cost of marketing for a homeowner using a flat fee agent is roughly $5,000.10  Using 
this estimate, net benefits to sellers outside an MLS are approximately $724 overall.11   However, 
if individuals select to sell through a listing agent and a MLS, pay a 5% commission and receive 
a 1.8% premium, the net commission cost including listing on a MLS is a smaller percentage of 
the selling price, or 3.2%, rather than the full 5%.  In exchange for this fee individuals gain 
marketing assistance and avoid the effort and other costs associated with marketing their own 
homes.  The willingness of individuals to pay this commission may be a result of being less 
equipped to market and sell their properties outside a MLS setting than NIO sellers are, or being 
under pressure to sell more quickly.  Possibly, individuals are poorly informed about the costs 
and benefits of full service listing agent services12.  It appears that individuals could be slightly 
better off financially selling outside a MLS, but prefer to forego the difference in net price to 
avoid the effort and stress of finding a buyer on their own and completing the transaction.  As 
stated earlier, we do not have data on time on the market.  For many individual sellers, a quick 
sale may be important.  Hendel, Nevo and Ortalo-Magné, (2009) indicate that agent services 
including MLS listing decreases average time to sale and this could partially explain an 
individual’s willingness to pay for MLS services.   
Other NIO grantors appear to obtain the same initial price whether they sell through a 
MLS or not.  With no offsetting premium for them to sell through the MLS, they would appear 
better off selling outside the MLS to improve their net cash flow. However, the true selling costs 
                                                 
10 Mark Nadel (2006) page 49 states “many former employees of traditional brokers are now willing to provide full-
service for flat fees of less than $5,000.” 
11  If overall commission rates of 6% are used in the analysis, then sellers are $2,513 better off selling outside a MLS 
after taking effort/marketing costs into account.  In this data 4.6% appears to be the breakeven rate, where sellers 
would be indifferent. 
12 Bernheim and Meer (2012) report a decrease in broker usage after circulation of an early version of their paper 
which indicated a financial loss to using brokers. 
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for NIO grantors are not quantified in this study.  Builders often market new developments 
directly to buyer’s agents,13 with detailed information on specific properties and commissions 
offered.  New residential developments also usually maintain “model homes” with onsite sales 
support.  These marketing strategies provide a substitute for MLS listing for this grantor group.  
A second NIO grantor group includes corporations, LLCs, and LPs that most likely are selling 
residential properties that have been improved or rehabilitated.  Some of these may have initially 
been investments for renovation and rent, or sale. It is less clear what independent marketing 
expertise this grantor group might use as an alternative to MLS listing.  Evidence from Tables 2 
and 3 shows that corporations and LPs are more likely to sell properties outside of the MLS than 
individuals, which suggests that these grantors also have some substitute marketing strategies 
which enable them to bypass a listing agent and sell outside the MLS, without selling at a 
discount. 
While our results show that NIO grantors make up a greater percentage of non-MLS 
sales, a larger number still sell through a MLS.  It is also possible that NIO grantors are in a 
better position to obtain a commission concession from the listing agent, since they are likely to 
sell properties more often.   
 Regrettably, we are unable to examine the time on the market for these properties which 
might help explain part of the premium or give us a more precise estimate of carrying and 
marketing costs. MLS listing could increase the likelihood of sale and decrease the time on 
market.  Both would have an impact on explaining the willingness of an individual seller to pay 
the 3.2% net commission compared to selling outside a MLS.  It would also be interesting to 
examine the probability of obtaining a sale within a given marketing time in the case of MLS 
                                                 
13 For example, in the real estate agent newspaper “Agent Direct News.”  Developers also encourage realtors to link 
to their webpages, providing technology (free to the realtor) that customizes the link to include the realtor’s contact 
information, rather than including contact information for the new construction sales team of the development.  
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properties and non-MLS properties.  Unfortunately, a more complete database than is currently 
available is needed to examine these issues.14 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the sales price of MLS sales relative to non-MLS sales using a 
unique data set from the Texas Comptroller’s Office for Dallas County during 2004-2005.  In 
general, our results support the extensive use of MLS services that we see in the market. We find 
that individual sellers obtain a 1.8% price premium selling through a MLS as opposed to not 
selling through a MLS.  NIO grantors obtain the same price selling through a MLS as they do 
selling outside a MLS.  These grantors may have access to and experience with alternative 
marketing strategies that make it possible for them to sell properties outside of the MLS without 
a price reduction.  Individuals either do not have access to these substitute marketing techniques, 
or are unwilling to accept the inconvenience and risks of doing so; thus when selling properties 
outside of the MLS, they sell at lower prices.  However the net price differential using a 5% 
commission and Levitt et al’s (2008) estimate of marketing costs suggest that sellers normally 
would be effectively financially indifferent between selling through a MLS or outside an MLS.  
If commission rates are higher than 5%, our estimates suggest an increase in the marginal 
benefits from selling outside an MLS.  These results are generally consistent with findings, by 
Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Mangé (2009) who provide evidence that sellers sort themselves into 
different market segments based on their selling preferences and strategy.    
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6.  Tables 
 
Table 2.1 
Definition of variables used in the models. 
Variable Description 
Selling Price selling price of the house, expressed as ln(sp) in the regression models. 
MLS dummy variable indicating a property sold through the Multiple Listing 
Service (MLS). 
Size number of square feet divided by 100. 
Age year of sale minus year built divided by 10. 
Bathrooms number of bathrooms. 
Bedrooms number of bedrooms. 
Fireplace number of fireplaces. 
Stories number of stories. 
Pool dummy variable indicating the presence of a pool. 
Deck dummy variable indicating a deck. 
Sprinkler dummy variable indicating a sprinkler system. 
Land Square Feet land square feet reported by the appraisal district, divided by 10,000. 
Land Percent land value as a percent of appraisal district total property value. 
Poor dummy variable indicating the appraisal district's "poor" rating of property 
Condition/Desirability/Utility. 
Fair dummy variable indicating the appraisal district's "fair" rating of property 
Condition/Desirability/Utility. 
Average dummy variable indicating the appraisal district's "average" rating of property 
Condition/Desirability/Utility. 
Good dummy variable indicating the appraisal district's "good" rating of property 
Condition/Desirability/Utility. 
Very Good dummy variable indicating the appraisal district's "very good" rating of 
property Condition/Desirability/Utility. 
Excellent dummy variable indicating the appraisal district's "excellent" rating of 
property Condition/Desirability/Utility. 
Estate dummy variable indicating grantor is an estate. 
Trust dummy variable indicating grantor is a trust. 
Company dummy variable indicating grantor is a company. 
LLC dummy variable indicating grantor is a limited liability corporation. 
LP dummy variable indicating grantor is a limited partnership. 
Financial dummy variable indicating grantor is a financial institution. 
FHLM dummy variable indicating grantor is the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation 
Builder dummy variable indicating grantor is a builder. 
Sale Month/Year dummies set of dummy variables controlling for market conditions at sale. 
Neighborhood fixed effects Neighborhood fixed effects for property based on Neighborhood codes 
provided by the Dallas County Appraisal District. 
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Table 2.2 
    
      
Descriptive statistics for the full sample and subsamples.  Includes properties that are identified as 
selling through a MLS and properties identified as selling outside the MLS.  Excluding residential 
houses with missing observations, the final sample includes 25,125 houses sold during January 2004-
June 2005, with 21,458 sales identified as having sold through a MLS and 3,667 outside the MLS.  
The data is from Dallas County.  Texas County Appraisal Districts (CADs) submit property sales 
information they collect to the Comptroller's office.  We do not report the month year dummy 
variables or appraisal district defined Neighborhood code dummies below for brevity.  There are 17 
months and 2,289 different Neighborhood codes in the sample.  The t-statistics are calculated to test 
the null: mean(MLS sale) - mean(non-MLS sale)=0.  Statistics with significance at the 1% level are 
denoted with a ** and the 5% level are denoted with a *. 
  
Full Sample 
  MLS sale, 
n=21,458 
  Non-MLS sale, 
n=3,667 
  
Summary Statistics          
of Key Variables 
    
   Mean 
   
Median       Mean 
   
Median       Mean 
   
Median t-statistics 
Selling Price 178,873 132,900  177,671 128,000  185,910 152,500 -3.15 ** 
MLS 0.854 1.00  1.00 1.00  0.00 0.00 -  
Size 1,945 1,764  1,909 1,728  2,160 1,966 -17.66 
** 
Age 29.945 27.00  31.737 30.00  19.457 18.00 36.99 ** 
Bathrooms 2.021 2.00  1.998 2.00  2.154 2.00 -13.25 
** 
Bedrooms 3.226 3.00  3.214 3.00 
 
3.298 3.00 -7.37 
** 
Fireplace 0.815 1.00  0.793 1.00 
 
0.945 1.00 -16.28 
** 
Stories 1.176 1.00  1.161 1.00 
 
1.268 1.00 -18.00 
** 
Pool 0.137 0.00  0.134 0.00  0.153 0.00 -3.09 ** 
Deck 0.057 0.00  0.059 0.00  0.047 0.00 2.74 ** 
Sprinkler 0.194 0.00  0.185 0.00  0.250 0.00 -9.15 ** 
Land Square Feet 0.986 0.84  0.998 0.85 
 
0.920 0.80 4.01 
** 
Land Percent 21.954 19.18  21.980 18.99 
 
21.800 20.27 0.94  
Poor 0.012 0.00  0.012 0.00  0.014 0.00 -1.31  
Fair 0.049 0.00  0.052 0.00  0.027 0.00 6.52 ** 
Average 0.224 0.00  0.228 0.00  0.198 0.00 4.09 ** 
Good 0.298 0.00  0.308 0.00  0.236 0.00 8.84 ** 
Very Good 0.229 0.00  0.226 0.00  0.245 0.00 -2.53 ** 
Excellent 0.189 0.00  0.173 0.00  0.279 0.00 -15.24 ** 
Individual Owners 0.852 1.00  0.864 1.00  0.787 1.00 12.12 ** 
Estate 0.006 0.00  0.006 0.00  0.007 0.00 -0.44  
Trust 0.011 0.00  0.011 0.00  0.010 0.00 0.91  
Company 0.016 0.00  0.015 0.00  0.019 0.00 -1.76  
LLC 0.004 0.00  0.004 0.00  0.005 0.00 -1.16  
LP 0.005 0.00  0.004 0.00  0.011 0.00 -5.98 ** 
Financial 0.073 0.00  0.079 0.00  0.032 0.00 10.14 ** 
FHLM 0.004 0.00  0.004 0.00  0.003 0.00 0.94  
Builder 0.029 0.00  0.013 0.00  0.126 0.00 -38.34 ** 
Sample Size 25,125     21,458     3,667       
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Table 2.3 
Probit model.  The dependent variable is whether the property is sold 
through a MLS or not.  The dependent variable takes a value of “1” if the 
property is sold via the MLS.  The model includes monthly dummy 
variables (not reported for brevity) and Dallas County Property Appraisal 
District Neighborhood fixed effects (not reported for brevity) to control for 
location/neighborhood characteristics.  The estimates of the coefficients are 
presented in the table, with t-statistics reported using heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors.  Statistics with significance at the 1% level are 
denoted with a ** and at the 5% level are denoted with a *.  
Independent Variable 
Model 1, 
probit 
Model 1, 
Reporting 
Marginal Effects 
t-statistics 
Constant 0.910** 
 
6.91 
Size -0.031** -0.005** -4.29 
Size squared 0.000** 0.000** 3.14 
Age 0.223** 0.038** 8.60 
Age squared -0.018** -0.003** -5.25 
Bathrooms 0.116** 0.019** 3.89 
Bedrooms 0.090** 0.015** 3.70 
Fireplace -0.025 -0.004 -0.83 
Stories 0.062 0.010 1.58 
Pool -0.067 -0.012 -1.89 
Deck 0.100 0.016 1.85 
Sprinkler 0.135** 0.022** 4.20 
Land Square feet -0.005 -0.001 -0.30 
Land Square feet squared 0.000 0.000 0.24 
Land Percentage -0.006** -0.001** -4.11 
Poor -0.340** -0.070** -3.32 
Fair 0.060 0.010 0.91 
Good 0.118** 0.019** 3.39 
Very Good 0.146** 0.023** 3.94 
Excellent 0.150** 0.024** 3.70 
Estate -0.431** -0.094** -3.20 
Trust -0.010 -0.002 -0.09 
Company -0.299** -0.060** -3.49 
LLC -0.296 -0.060 -1.84 
LP -0.689** -0.171** -5.49 
Financial 0.379** 0.051** 6.97 
FHLM 0.208 0.030 1.03 
Builder -1.358** -0.414** -22.93 
Sale Year Month fixed effects Yes     
Neighborhood fixed effects Yes 
 
 
Number of Observations 25,125 
 
 
Pseudo R2 0.2954 
 
 
Log - pseudolikelihood -7,358 
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Table 2.4 
    
Regression models of full sample  house prices.  This is based on a sample of 25,125 residential houses sold during January 2004-June 2005 
obtained from the state of Texas for Dallas County.  The variable of interest is whether the property sold through the MLS or not.  In this full 
sample 14.60% or 3,667 sold outside the MLS.  Individuals are the baseline category in this sample for the grantor types. County Appraisal 
Districts (CADs) are required to submit property sales information they collect to the Comptroller's office which allows for a determination of 
MLS or non-MLS sales. All models include month/year dummy variables (not reported for brevity) to control for potential serial effects and all 
regressions include Neighborhood fixed effects (not reported for brevity) to control for location/neighborhood characteristics.  The estimates of 
the coefficients are presented in the table, with t-statistics reported using heteroskedasticity-robust Huebner/White standard errors.  Statistics 
with significance at the 1% level are denoted with a ** and at the 5% level are denoted with a *. 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 11.223** 338.20 11.335** 296.69 11.302** 280.47 11.271** 297.21 
MLS 0.024** 3.48 0.008 1.55 0.005 1.11 0.017** 3.71 
Size 
  
0.025** 17.80 0.027** 19.85 0.028** 21.18 
Size squared 
  
-0.000** -8.79 -0.000** -9.96 -0.000** -10.63 
Age 
  
-0.063** -9.29 -0.059** -8.91 -0.059** -8.99 
Age squared 
  
0.006** 7.26 0.006** 7.09 0.006** 7.30 
Bathrooms 
  
0.022** 6.74 0.022** 7.00 0.022** 7.21 
Bedrooms 
  
0.004 1.55 0.005* 1.98 0.006** 2.66 
Fireplace 
  
0.023** 6.06 0.023** 6.28 0.026** 7.28 
Stories 
  
-0.005 -0.94 -0.009 -1.81 -0.004 -0.95 
Pool 
  
0.047** 13.75 0.049** 14.80 0.051** 16.17 
Deck 
  
0.015** 3.18 0.010* 2.12 0.012** 2.88 
Sprinkler 
  
0.017** 5.85 0.012** 4.34 0.012** 4.35 
Land Square Feet 
  
0.061** 14.00 0.059** 13.73 0.058** 14.26 
Land Squared 
  
-0.001** -10.38 -0.001** -10.13 -0.001** -10.97 
Land Percentage 
  
-0.016** -28.52 -0.014** -24.84 -0.013** -23.80 
Poor 
    
-0.116** -6.34 -0.117** -6.53 
Fair 
    
-0.063** -8.61 -0.059** -8.30 
Good 
    
0.022** 6.58 0.027** 8.37 
Very Good 
    
0.046** 12.16 0.053** 14.92 
Excellent 
    
0.053** 11.94 0.065** 15.19 
Estate 
      
-0.038* -2.52 
Trust 
      
0.002 0.22 
Company 
      
-0.014 -1.23 
LLC 
      
0.004 0.19 
LP 
      
0.036* 2.29 
Financial 
      
-0.186** -41.30 
FHLM 
      
-0.117** -7.07 
Builder 
      
0.033** 3.12 
Sale Year/Month fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Neighborhood fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 25,125 25,125 25,125  25,125  
Adjusted R2 0.892 
 
0.94 
 
0.942  0.947  
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Table 2.5   
Regression models of individual-owned house prices.  This is based on a sample of 21,614 residential houses 
owned by individuals and sold during January 2004-June 2005 obtained from the state of Texas for Dallas 
County.  The variable of interest is whether the property sold through the MLS or not.  Individuals are the 
baseline category for the grantor types in this sample. In this sample 13.84% or 2,991 are sold outside the MLS.  
County Appraisal Districts (CADs) are required to submit property sales information they collect to the 
Comptroller's office which allows for a determination of MLS or non-MLS sales. All models include month/year 
dummy variables (not reported for brevity) to control for potential serial effects and all regressions include 
Neighborhood fixed effects (not reported for brevity) to control for location/neighborhood characteristics.  The 
estimates of the coefficients are presented in the table, with t-statistics reported using heteroskedasticity-robust 
Huebner/White standard errors.  Statistics with significance at the 1% level are denoted with a ** and at the 5% 
level are denoted with a *. 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 11.227** 371.93 11.298** 303.60 11.248** 293.31 
MLS 0.038** 4.98 0.018** 3.58 0.018** 3.64 
Size 
  
0.026** 17.43 0.028** 19.91 
Size squared 
  
-0.000** -8.41 -0.000** -9.84 
Age 
  
-0.060** -8.38 -0.055** -7.94 
Age squared 
  
0.006** 7.13 0.006** 6.90 
Bathrooms 
  
0.020** 6.13 0.020** 6.40 
Bedrooms 
  
0.006* 2.25 0.007** 2.80 
Fireplace 
  
0.026** 6.64 0.027** 7.14 
Stories 
  
-0.001 -0.12 -0.004 -0.87 
Pool 
  
0.049** 14.41 0.052** 15.80 
Deck 
  
0.016** 3.49 0.010* 2.20 
Sprinkler 
  
0.019** 6.43 0.014** 4.99 
Land Square Feet 
  
0.062** 12.24 0.058** 12.12 
Land Squared 
  
-0.001** -10.42 -0.001** -10.41 
Land Percentage 
  
-0.016** -26.17 -0.013** -22.03 
Poor 
    
-0.126** -6.09 
Fair 
    
-0.061** -7.92 
Good 
    
0.032** 9.56 
Very Good 
    
0.060** 15.73 
Excellent 
    
0.076** 16.14 
Estate 
    
- - 
Trust 
    
- - 
Company 
    
- - 
LLC 
    
- - 
LP 
    
- - 
Financial 
    
- - 
FHLM 
    
- - 
Builder 
    
- - 
Sale Year/Month fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Neighborhood fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
Number of Observations 21,614 21,614 21,614  
Adjusted R2 0.899 
 
0.948 
 
0.950  
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Table 2.6     
Regression models of NIO house prices.  This is based on a sample of 3,511 residential houses sold by not-individual-
owners (NIO) during January 2004-June 2005 obtained from the state of Texas for Dallas County.  Company is the 
baseline category for the grantor types in this sample. The variable of interest is whether the property sold through the 
MLS or not.  In this sample 19.25% or 676 sold outside the MLS.  County Appraisal Districts (CADs) are required to 
submit property sales information they collect to the Comptroller's office which allows for a determination of MLS or 
non-MLS sales. All models include month/year dummy variables (not reported for brevity) to control for potential serial 
effects and all regressions include Neighborhood fixed effects (not reported for brevity) to control for 
location/neighborhood characteristics.  The estimates of the coefficients are presented in the table, with t-statistics 
reported using heteroskedasticity-robust Huebner/White standard errors.  Statistics with significance at the 1% level are 
denoted with a ** and at the 5% level are denoted with a *. 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 11.175** 46.33 11.563** 57.04 11.595** 56.09 11.490** 67.92 
MLS -0.013 -0.51 -0.032 -1.94 -0.030 -1.84 0.014 0.91 
Size 
  
0.020** 4.04 0.019** 3.89 0.022** 4.75 
Size squared 
  
-0.000* -2.37 -0.000* -2.28 -0.000** -2.87 
Age 
  
-0.093** -3.67 -0.093** -3.65 -0.082** -3.44 
Age squared 
  
0.007 1.88 0.007 1.89 0.006 1.72 
Bathrooms 
  
0.029* 2.08 0.030* 2.08 0.031* 2.44 
Bedrooms 
  
-0.005 -0.50 -0.006 -0.57 0.004 0.43 
Fireplace 
  
-0.003 -0.22 -0.002 -0.14 0.007 0.51 
Stories 
  
0.009 0.55 0.009 0.57 0.008 0.58 
Pool 
  
0.008 0.42 0.006 0.31 0.028 1.62 
Deck 
  
-0.015 -0.51 -0.014 -0.48 0.020 0.77 
Sprinkler 
  
-0.000 -0.02 0.005 0.38 0.005 0.43 
Land Square Feet 
  
0.075** 3.98 0.074** 3.94 0.063** 3.51 
Land Squared 
  
-0.001 -1.83 -0.001 -1.80 -0.001 -1.41 
Land Percentage 
  
-0.021** -10.70 -0.021** -10.42 -0.018** -9.79 
Poor 
    
-0.049 -0.98 -0.062 -1.37 
Fair 
    
-0.031 -1.04 -0.025 -0.95 
Good 
    
-0.025 -1.67 0.001 0.05 
Very Good 
    
-0.034* -2.03 0.007 0.48 
Excellent 
    
-0.033* -2.35 -0.005 -0.38 
Estate 
      
-0.038 -1.23 
Trust 
      
0.016 0.75 
Company 
      
- - 
LLC 
      
0.018 0.45 
LP 
      
0.056* 1.99 
Financial 
      
-0.194** -11.24 
FHLM 
      
-0.131** -4.41 
Builder 
      
0.008 0.38 
Sale Year/Month fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Neighborhood fixed effects Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  Yes  
Number of Observations 3,511 3,511 3,511  3,511  
Adjusted R2 0.915 
 
0.946 
 
0.946  0.956  
 
